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ABSTRACT. 
This Thesis falls loosely into 2 Parts. 
In Part 1 (Chs. 1-4) a certain version of the view generally 
called "Realism" is put forward. This Realism is a view that can 
take either of two forms, one weak or soft, the other hard or strong. 
The first form states that there is an external world, which we 
experience and which influences language. The second form states 
that there is an external world, which is mirrored in consciousness 
and which is also mirrored in language. That is, the contents of 
consciousness and the contents of language correspond exactly to an 
absolute external world. This second stronger version (which I call 
"Metaphysical Realism") is refuted in Chapters 2-4. 
Refuting it, however, still leaves us with the first view 
intact. In the rest of the thesis I argue that this first weaker 
version of Realism is essentially correct. This is because: 
a. Objects do indeed exist. (Ch. 5) 
b. At least part of what we do when we say we see Xis refer to 
a genuine experience of X. (Chs 6 & 7) 
c. In a certain sense the world is known non-linguistically. 
(Ch. 8) 
The final chapter, Ch. 9, is designed to show how language 
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influences what might loosely be called the "External World". Hence 
we end up with a genuine "Realism" which is yet in a sense "language 
dependent'', for this "real world" is formed by language which then 
reports on the world so formed. 
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Chapter 1. 
A "METAPHYSICAL REALISTS" STORY. 
Most of us I suppose like to think of ourselves as realists; 
and if we don't, there are plenty of people only too prepared to tell 
us we ought to be. For instance, such people advise us to face up 
to "the hard facts of reality" and not to "go chasing pots of gold at 
the end of the rainbow". And this indoctrination starts right from 
our childhood. Consider the following children's tale. 
"Once upon a time a fast talking tailor turned up at 
the court of a nameless kingdom and told the King of that 
nameless kingdom that he, the tailor, would make the King 
the finest suit of new clothes that anyone had ever seen. 
From his bag the tailor took what he said were bolts of 
cloth and held them up, one by one, for the King to see. 
As he did so the tailor enthused over the vivacity of their 
colour, the subtlety of their pattern and the delicacy of 
their weave. The King, not wishing to seem vulgar before 
this eloquent and sophisticated tailor, agreed that the 
cloth was quite peerless and ordered a new suit of clothes 
straight away. 
The tailor set to work at once. For many days he 
snipped at the invisible cloth with his scissors. Then, 
for many more days, he sewed the invisible cloth with 
invisible thread. Finally the tailor announced that he was 
finished. The King donned his new suit and expressed his 
satisfaction. He paraded before a wildly enthusiastic 
court. The men were green with envy, the women were tipsy 
with admiration. They were very sophisticated people these 
courtiers. 
The following day however there was a royal 
procession. The King donned his new suit of clothes and 
marched forth, surrounded by his knights and pages, in 
great pomp. The people, forewarned by the courtiers not to 
display their stupidity and ignorance by failing to see the 
intricacy and beauty of the King's new attire, applauded 
wildly. Then, quite suddenly, the King came alongside two 
street urchins who first tittered and then laughed in the 
brazen self confident way that common people often do. 
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"The silly old fart is starkers!" one of them shouted. 
The other blew the King a raspberry and they both slipped 
off into a side alley laughing derisively as they went. 
At first there was a stunned silence, then there was a 
giggle, then there was laughter and finally there was a 
gale of laughter as first part of the crowd, then the whole 
crowd and finally the court itself laughed at their 
pretentious and duped monarch. In the cold light of those 
urchins eyes the mighty verbal illusion, born and 
perpetuated by the state had dissolved. No one can present 
a false picture of reality and get away with it forever." 
This surely is an object lesson to us all, a lesson that, try as 
we might, we cannot change the hard face of reality: for if we do, 
we too are liable to be made fools of by some frank and odious 
urchin. We must report what we see for fear of ridicule and what we 
see cannot be alterred by mere linguistic trickery. 
But this, after all, is a rather nebulous moral. Surely, we are 
inclined to think, there must be a more precise way of tying down 
what the truth is and how to tell it. Perhaps we ought to say 
something like this. FIRSTLY: there are objects absolute and 
independent of us. SECONDLY: we see these objects exactly as they 
are for they are mirrored in our consciousness. It is this mirroring 
that allows us to know the world. THIRDLY: our language too mirrors 
the world; it is that that guarantees its truth. Of course it 
follows that FOURTHLY: we know the world first through perception 
and then put words to what we know. We must see the world before we 
can mirror it in language. This view is the view of a "Metaphysical 
Realist", a man who holds a "copy theory" of truth and knowledge. 
Even at a glance it seems persuasive. In its detail however it seems 
even more persuasive. 
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* * * * * * * * * * 
Why Objects exist. 
Why do we believe in bedrock objects? There are, of course, 
many reasons for this belief and I intend only to deal with the most 
crucial. FIRSTLY; man is a vulnerable creature and a creature with 
certain nutritive needs. In order to feed himself, and therefore 
survive, he must have an awareness of certain things as being food. 
Food may be absent or present within man's immediate enviroment. 
Food and nutrition may be imagined: but it goes without saying, a 
man who attempts to live on imagined food will quickly die. Thus 
food appears an external factor to man; something alien to himself, 
a physical object in a physical world. And not only does man need 
objects of a certain sort to sustain him; other objects are a threat 
to him. He may bump into trees, fall over precipices, be drowned by 
water, buried by landslides or himself become food for other living 
things. Any man who neglects the dangers of all these things will 
live a short life full of physical suffering. In fact, in a sense, 
it is impossible to neglect these things. They force themselves upon 
our attention: try as we may we cannot, for example, prevent water 
from having the ability to drown us or falls from breaking our bones. 
Objects and their dangers are part of our facticity. We are part of 
the life of the world and the world is the arena in which our drama 
is enacted and an arena is itself an object. So, there are 
biological reasons for believing in objects. 
SECONDLY: we are all aware that sometimes our senses fail to 
work as they should. We know that sometimes we do not hear the lion 
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coming through the undergrowth or that we do not see the loose stone 
that will throw us over the precipice. We know that if we close our 
eyes we do not see the tree outside our front door; but we can still 
feel it if we approach it, we can still smell it in the air and hear 
the wind blowing through its branches. Failure of any one sense does 
not involve the simultaneous failure of all other senses. If I stop 
seeing the tree the tree is still just as scented and just as hard. 
Indeed, if all our senses stop, if we cannot see, hear, smell or 
taste the tree, we believe we will still feel it. (That is why 
"solidity" was included in Locke's Primary Qualities.) So objects go 
on existing and being either lethal or nutritious or both, even when 
virtually all our five senses fail. (Indeed, even if we lost our 
sense of feel, we should still expect to be eaten by the hungry 
lion.) 
THIRDLY: we all know that sometimes we get things wrong; 
especially when we eat strange mushrooms. Now and again we see 
hippos crossing the road when there are just no hippos there.There 
aren't any footprints left, no hippo droppings remain and there are 
simply no hippos in New Zealand anyway. Surely the easiest way to 
account for these illusions is just to say there was no object there: 
nothing nutritious or lethal,heavy or light, grey or brown. As 
before, we come to believe there are objects; because there are 
phenomena outside our conscious control which affect us for good or 
ill. In short, things in the world are "given" to us: and we must 
"passively" accept what is given. The world is composed of "that 
which is experienced" and "that which we experience". 
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* * * * * * * * * * 
Seeing as Mirroring. 
This seems especially so in the case of vision. Most of us I 
suppose believe that sight is our primary sense. But exactly how 
sight works has always been a difficult matter; especially once 
there are two orders, objects and perceptions of objects, or "that 
which is experienced" and "that which we experience". One of the 
earliest attempted solutions to this problem was that of Empedocles, 
repeated in Plato's Timaeus. 
And of the organs they first contrived of the eyes to give 
light, and the principle according to which they were 
inserted was as follows. So much of fire as would not 
bur~, but gave a gentle light, they formed into a substance 
akin to the light of everyday life, and the pure fire which 
is within us and related thereto they made to flow through 
the eyes in a stream smooth and dense, compressing the 
whole eye and especially the centre part, so that it kept 
out everything of a coarser nature and allowed to pass only 
this pure element. When the light of day surrounds the 
stream of vision, then like falls upon like, and they 
coalesce, and one body is formed by natural affinity in the 
line of vision, wherever the light that falls from within 
meets with an external object. And the whole stream of 
vision, being similarly affected in virtue of the 
similarity diffuses the motions of what it touches or what 
touches it over the whole body, until they reach the soul, 
causing that perception which we call sight. (Timaeus 45, 
b-d. Trans. B. Jowett.) 
This seems a messy picture. Both object and viewer shoot forth 
tentacles of light which co-mingle and the vibrations, emitted by the 
object, pass down the tentacle emitted by the eye and enlighten the 
soul as to the nature of the object seen. Perhaps it was this very 
messiness which led later generations to ignore this picture. 
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Perhaps it was simply the ingenuity of Arab artisans and alchemists, 
whose optical devices suggested a better analogy, which led to the 
demise of the Platonic view. But, whatever the reason, a new, more 
PASSIVE view of seeing came to be adopted; a view in which a 
passively receptive body mirrored "that which was seen". 
The first known exponent of the new analogy was an 11th century 
Arab scholar, known as Alhazen, who devised the first "camera 
obscura 11 • This exciting toy became more and more sophisticated over 
the centuries and became especially beguiling once the pinhole in the 
front of the device was replaced by a lens. Damiel~ Barbaro gives 
the following description of a camera obscura in his 11 Practica della 
Perspectiva." (1568-69). 
Close all the shutters and doors until no light enters the 
camera except throught the lens, and opposite hold a sheet 
of paper, which you move forward and backward until the 
scene appears in the sharpest detail. There on the paper 
you will see the whole as it really is, with its distances, 
its colours and shadows and motion, the clouds, the water 
twinkling, the birds flying. By holding the paper steady 
you can trace the whole perspective with a pen, shade it 
and delicately colour it from nature. 
And this seemed, and still does seem to many, the perfect analogy of 
vision. Instead of the image being reflected on the back wall of the 
camera obscura, or the moving paper within it, as above, the image 
was simply reflected on the back of the eye itself. The world was 
mirrored in living flesh. But, not only did the back of the eye 
become a mirror, the front portions of the eye came to be seen as 
lenses, to explain, not only how so large a thing as the world could 
be mirrored in so small a place as the eye, but also, to ensure that 
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the world was represented faithfully at the back of the eye. 
And it is the eye as a truly mirroring optical device that 
French philosopher and scientist, Rene Descartes, describes so 
brilliantly in his Treatise of Man. 
(Fig. 9. Treatise of Man. pg 50) 
In the first membrane, the part BCB (the cornea) is 
transparent, and a little more arched than the rest; and 
the refraction of rays entering it occurs towards the 
perpendicular. In the second membrane (the iris), the 
internal surface of the part EF (our pupillary sphincter 
and di:lator muscles), which faces the back of the eye, is 
completely black and opaque, and has at its centre a little 
round hole that is called the pupil and appears black at 
the middle of the eye when one looks at it from without. 
The hole is not always the same size, because part EF of 
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the membrane that the hole is in, swimming freely in humour 
K, which is very liquid, seems to be like a little muscle 
that is enlarged or diminished under the direction of the 
brain as use requires. 
The shape of the humour marked L, which is called the 
crystalline humour (the lens), is like the shape of the 
glasses I described in the treatise on Dioptrics, by means 
of which all the rays that come from certain points are 
assembled at certain other points; and its matter is less 
soft, is firmer, and consequently causes a greater 
refraction than that of the two other humours that surround 
it. 
E and N are black filaments that come from within the 
membrane DEF and completely encircle the crystalline 
humour; they are like so many little tendons by means of 
which ~ts shape can be changed and rendered a little 
flatter or a little more arched according to need. Finally 
00 are six or seven muscles which are attached to the eye 
on the outside and can move it very easily and very quickly 
in all directions. 
Now the membrane BCB (the cornea), and the three 
humours K, L and M (aqueous, crystalline and vitreous), 
being very clear and transparent do not prevent the rays of 
light which enter through the pupil from penetrating the 
back of the eye where the nerve is, nor from striking as 
easily against it as if it were exposed; they serve 
(rather) to protect it (the retina) against injuries from 
air and other external bodies which could wound it easily 
if they touched it; and (they serve) further to keep it so 
delicate and tender that there is no wonder it can be moved 
by acts so slightly perceptible as those I here take to be 
colours. (Treatise of Man. pp 51-53.) 
Now this view, if it is correct, must go a long way towards 
making the world safe for Realism. Whatever is placed before the 
lens of the eye is reproduced in great detail on the retina due to 
the refractive capacity of the eye. And, if you are inclined to view 
Descartes as an antique figure, it will perhaps come as a surprise to 
know that his picture of the eye is virtually identical to the modern 
picture. In "Eye and Brain" (pp 49-64) R.L. Gregory gives an almost 
identical account of the physiology and function of the eye. Indeed, 
even Gregory's criticism of Descartes, that Descartes believed most 
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refraction took place at the lens rather than the cornea, is 
misplaced, as a close examination of Descartel diagrams shows. 
(Gregory probably made this mistake by paying too much attention to 
Fig. 9 which does indeed seem to show this. Subsequent Figures, 
however, make it perfectly plain that Descartes too believed the 
cornea to be the primary organ of refraction. Figure 12 is 
especially good in this respect.) In fact the only important 
difference between the two accounts is, as Gregory rightly points 
out, that the surface of the retina is relatively insensitive to 
light and the sensitive "photoreceptors" are at the back of the eye, 
behind a mesh of of blood vessels and nerve fibres. So DescarteJ 
analogy with the camera obscura has been continued right to the 
present day. The eye as mirror of the world seems like "the on~y 
game in town". 
Moreover, Descartes and Gregory are in total agreement over the 
purpose of the eye; namely that it serves to enlighten the organism 
concerned about the true state of the world. Through the eyes 
reality is made explicit, a reality of movement and physical objects. 
Detection of movement is essential to survival. From 
the animals lowest on the evolutionary scale to man, moving 
objects are likely to be either dangerous or potential 
food, and so rapid and appropriate action is demanded, 
while stationary objects can generally be ignored. Indeed 
it now seems that it is only the eyes of the highest 
animals which can signal to the brain the absence of 
movement. 
Something of the evolutionary development of the eye, 
from movement to shape perception, can be seen embalmed in 
the human retina. The edge of the retina is sensitive only 
to movement. This may be seen by getting someone to wave 
an object around at the side of the visual field, where 
only the edge of the retina is stimulated. It will be 
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found that the movement is seen but it is impossible to 
identify the object. When the movement stops the object 
becomes invisible. This is as close as we come to 
experiencing primitive perception. The very extreme edge 
of the retina is even more primitive: when stimulated by 
movement we experience nothing, but a reflex is intitated 
which rotates ·the eye to bring the moving object into 
central vision, so that the highly developed foveal region 
with its associated central neural network is brought into 
play for identifying the object. The edge of the retina is 
thus an early warning device, used to rotate the eyes to 
aim the sophisticated object-recognition part of the system 
on to objects likely to be friend or foe or food rather 
than neutral. (Eye and Brain, pp 93.) 
Such an eye is obviously splendidly equipped to mirror a world full 
of objects, especially those which are threatening or nutritious. 
Descartes too, while not so concerned with the survival value of the 
mirroring eye, similarly esteems it for its ability to enlighten the 
organism as to the position and quality of surrounding objects. 
(Fig. 14, Treatise of Man. pg 61.) 
Similarly, if eye Dis turned toward object E (Fig 14), the 
soul will be able to know the position of this object, 
inasmuch as (in the brain) the nerves from this eye are 
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differently arranged than if it were turned towards some 
other object. And (the soul) will be able to know the 
shape (of E), inasmuch as rays from point I assembling on 
the nerve termed optic (the retina) at point 2 -- and those 
from point 3 at point 4, and so forth -- will trace there a 
shape corresponding exactly to the shape of E. Note also 
that the soul will be able to know the distance of point 1, 
for, as has just been mentioned, in order to make all the 
rays coming from point 1 assemble precisely at point 2 at 
the centre of the back of the eye, the crystalline humor 
will be of a different shape than if the object were nearer 
or farther away. (Treatise of Man. pp 60 - 61.) 
The eye is considered by both Gregory and Descartes to enlighten man 
as to the exact nature of the world around him. 
And surely they 2re right about this? Isn't the fact that the 
eye truly mirrors the world shown by the mistakes animals make when 
their vision is in some way distorted? M.H. Pfister, for instance, 
attached right-left reversing prisms to the eyes of hens and found 
that they were unable to feed themselves and that their behaviour 
became severely disturbed. Even when less severe distortions were 
used chickens proved very incapacitated. A. Hess attached wedge 
prisms to the eyes of chickens and, even though these prisms shifted 
the images by no more than 7 degrees to either right or left, the 
chickens persistently pecked to one side of the grain they were 
feeding on. We are naturally disposed to say that the eye is 
designed to give us an accurate picture of the world and, if this 
picture is distorted, the organism suffers accordingly. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
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Speaking as Mirroring. 
Now, if the world of objects is so tidily mirrored in 
consciousness, it would seem only proper that our language too should 
mirror what is in the world. Where there are objects, there are 
object words; and where there are actions, there are action words. 
Each particular piece of the world has its counter-part in language. 
All Referential Theories of Language and Correspondence Theories 
of Truth have this as their basic premise (though some such theories 
omit consciousness as part of the overall picture). The broad 
picture was first painted by Plato in the Sophist, where these 
supposedly degenerate figures, Sophists, were accused of making word 
images that were different from the objects they were images of and, 
hence, failing to mirror the world in words. The basic philosophical 
picture has been repeated many times since. One of the first to 
repeat it in the modern era (post Descartes) was Leibniz. 
I only mean that [verbal] characters must show, when they 
are used in demonstrations, some kind of connection, 
grouping and order which are also found in the [natural] 
objects, and that that is required, if not in the single 
words -- though it were better so -- then at least in their 
union and connection. This order and correspondence at 
least must be present in all languages, though in different 
ways. And that leaves me with hope for a solution of the 
difficulty. For even though characters are as such 
arbitrary, there is still in their application and 
connection something valid which is not arbitrary; namely, 
a relationship which exists among them and things, and 
consequently, definite relations among all the different 
characters used to express the same things. And this 
relationship, this connection is the foundation of truth. 
For this explains why no matter which characters we use, 
the result remains the same, or at least the results which 
we find are equivalent and correspond to one another in 
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definite ways. Some kind of characters is surely always 
required in thinking. (Dialogue on the Connection Between 
Things and Words. Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip Wiener. 
p 10) 
Language clearly mirrors, or ought to do its best to mirror, the 
world, 
More recently, this view was baldly stated by Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. 
2,15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way represents that things are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of 
the picture, and let us call the possibility of this 
structure the pictorial form of the picture. 
2,1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it 
reaches right out to it. 
2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure. 
The same applies to language of course, for one of the ways in which 
reality may be pictured is by words. 
4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I 
understand a proposition, I know the situation that it 
represents. And I understand the proposition without 
having had its sense explained to me. 
But the details of this correspondence are often difficult to work 
out in practice. Usually however, the picture is one where the names 
correspond, either to things or ideas of things; and the logical 
structure of the language either does, or should, correspond to the 
14 
logical structure of the facts. Such a logically perfect language is 
described in detail by Bertrand Russell (acknowledging Wittgenstein) 
in his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" lecture. 
In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition 
would correspond one by one with the components of the 
corresponding fact with the exception of such words as 
"or", "not", "if", "then" which have a different function. 
In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and 
no more for every simple object, and everything that is not 
simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a 
combination derived, of course, from the words for the 
simple things that enter in, one word for each simple 
component. A language of that sort will be completely 
analytic, will show at a glance the logical structure of 
the facts asserted or denied. The language set forth in 
Principia Mathematica is intended to be a language of that 
sort. It is a language which has only syntax and no 
vocabulary what soever. (Logic and Knowledge Pp 197-98. 
ed. Robert Marsh.) 
All the elements of mirroring are here. Simple things are 
corresponded to by simple words. Blueness is corresponded to by the 
word "blue", squareness by the word "square" and Richard Perrott by 
the name "Richard Perrott", overlooking of course that Richard 
Perrott is not a "simple". Moreover the "simples" enter into various 
relations with one another; the book may be blue for instance. 
These relations will also be reflected by the syntax of the language. 
Hence, two simples in relation compose a fact, a fact whose structure 
is reflected by the syntax of the language, so that things and facts 
both come to be mirrored in the language. 
In Leibniz, Wittgenstein and Russell this picture is presented 
as somewhat of an ideal for language to strive after. But it was 
also assumed that mirroring was how our actual language worked 
(despite the inconvenience of our terminology for analysing it). Thus 
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"Napoleon married Josephine" actually did picture a single atomic 
fact; and the words "Napoleon" and "Josephine" and "married" 
actually did each correspond to an entity or relation which did in 
fact exist. Of course there were problems with our common language. 
It contained all sorts of expressions which were later called by Ryle 
"Systematically Misleading". Words such as "horse", "God", "virtue" 
and "the present King of France" all seemed to correspond to things; 
but didn't, since there was nothing for them to correspond to. But 
these were considered manifestations of the inadequacy of the 
ordinary language and it's proneness to try to confuse us as to the 
true nature of the facts. Basically the language was assumed to 
follow the ideal structure of the language of Principia Mathematica; 
which itself mirrored the structure of the external world. Truth, 
absolute truth, was thereby assured. 
And surely these philosophers must be right. Mirroring must be 
the way language works; for indeed, there are facts and true and 
false statements about them in our language. If I say that the grass 
on my front lawn is green, surely we read and understand the sentence 
and then go and look at the front lawn to see if the grass is, in 
fact, green. Do we not compare the contents of the sentence with the 
content of reality? And, if I say that on July 14th 1789 the 
Parisian mob stormed the Bastille, what I say is presumably true or 
false; and it is presumably true or false depending on whether or 
not, on that particular day, the Parisian mob actually did do just 
that. We compare the action which the sentence asserts happened with 
the action which actually did happen; and if they match up then the 
statement is true. Such comparisons form the foundation of all 
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empirical disciplines; and empirical disciplines surely forrn the 
basis of our intellectual and political life. If language does not 
work that way we have been living out a lie. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
The Pre-condition for Mirroring. 
But of course, if language mirrors the world, then the world is 
primary and the language secondary. There can be no image in a 
mirror without an object. By the same token there can be no true 
proposition which does not mirror objects in various relations. The 
world cannot therefore be language dependent; but quite the 
contrary, the language must be world dependent. Learning a language 
is, in a real sense, subsequent to learning about the world. And 
this too scientists seem to have shown; for there are many random 
experiments which show that children have a lively appreciation of 
objects, object persistence and cause long before they can talk. 
Jerome Bruner has found that babies of a few months, who 
certainly cannot talk and show little or no response to language, 
have a considerable appreciation of objects in the external world. 
When Bruner made video films of babies reaching for toys or wooden 
bricks he found they opened their fingers to the appropriate size of 
the objects, as well as judging their distance and direction. T. C. 
Bower found a similar appreciation of objects amongst young children. 
He presented stereoscopic images to babies and found, that when the 
babies reached out to touch these apparent objects and could not, 
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they showed either surprise or distress. 
Moreover babies seem to quite rapidly develop notions of object 
persistence. Even very young babies, watching an object move behind 
an opaque screen; move their eyes to the other end of the screen 
anticipating that something will emerge. If, in fact, nothing 
emerges they often manifest surprise. Very young babies however do 
not tend to be surprised if a teddy bear passes behind the screen and 
a different object, say a fire engine, emerges. Children of a year 
old however, and one year olds do not normally manifest any 
linguistic ability, often become quite upset at such a 
transformation. This surely illustrates that they have already 
grasped, what is called by psychologists, ''object persistence"; and 
that they have done so quite independently of language. 
The conclusions of these somewhat random experiments are 
repeated and carefully integrated in the work of Jean Piaget. 
Piaget's conception is rather Kantian, as his notion of "schema'' 
shows. But he also believes there is a world of natural objects: to 
which we can adapt or fail to adapt. This is implicit in the notions 
of "assimilation" and "accomodation". It is explicit, however, in 
much of the rest of Piaget's work: for Piaget is quite emphatic that 
our notions of "object" and "cause" are pre-linguistic and are 
developed in what he calls the "sensori-motor phase", which occurs 
between O and 2 years. In Stage 2 of the Sensori-Motor Phase, 1-4 
months, Piaget claims that children begin to distinguish objects. 
They follow things that move, they look for things in a certain 
location where they are accustomed to seeing them. 
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Thus, Lucienne, at 0;3[9] sees me at the 
her visual field and smiles vaguely. 
different directions, in front of her and 
constantly returns to the place in which 
dwells on it every time for a moment. 
extreme left of 
She then looks in 
to the right, but 
she sees me and 
At 0;4[26] she takes the breast but turns when I call her 
and smiles at me. Then she resumes nursing but several 
times in succession, despite my silence, she turns directly 
to the position from which she can see me.She does it again 
after a pause of a few minutes. Then I withdraw; when she 
turns without finding me her expression is one of 
disappointment and expectation. (The Construction of 
Reality in the Child. pp 10-11.) 
By Stage 3 of the Sensori-Motor Phase, 4-8 months, children are 
beginning to develop notions of the permanence of objects. 
But: 
Observation 6 - Laurent's reaction to falling objects still 
seems to be non-existent at 0;5[24]: he does not follow 
with his eyes any of the objects which I drop in front of 
him. 
At 0;7[29] he searches on the floor for everything I drop 
above him, if he has in the least perceived the movement of 
falling----. (The Construction of Reality in the Child. 
p 15.) 
Obviously the child is beginning to believe that objects persist 
through time and can change location. 
By Stage 4, 8-12 months, infants begin anticipating certain events. 
They seem, according to Piaget, to know that certain events cause 
certain other events. In The Origins of Intelligence in Children, 
Piaget illustrates his contention in the following way. 
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Observation 132 - At 0;8[6] Laurent recognises by a certain 
noise caused by air that he is nearing the end of his 
feeding and, instead of insisting on drinking to the last 
drop, he rejects his bottle----. 
Observation 133 - At 0;9[15] Jaqueline wails or cries when 
she sees the person seated next to her get up or move away 
a little [giving the impression of leaving]----. 
At 1;1[10] she has a slight scratch which is disinfected 
with alcohol. She cries, chiefly from fear. Subsequently, 
as soon as she again sees the bottle of alcohol she 
recommences to cry, knowing what is in store for her. Two 
days later, same reaction, as soon as she sees the bottle 
and even before it is opened. (pp 248-249.) 
I could, of course, continue with other examples of children 
developing a pre-linguistic knowledge of objects and causes; but the 
above, if correct, must suffice to show that children do indeed 
ach~eve a quite sophisticated knowledge of the external oorld of 
objects long before they can talk, 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Mirroring, and the philosophical views which go with it (Realism 
and Language Independence) therefore seem the only sensible views. 
We know there are objects in the world because of our hunger, 
vulnerability and mortality; and because if any one sense lets us 
down, the other senses will soon be made unpleasantly aware of what 
the first sense failed to detect. Moreover, it seems perfectly 
plausible that consciousness mirrors the world, that an image of the 
world is cast on the retina, an image of which we are immediately 
aware. If this were not the case surely, like Hess' chickens, we 
should continually miss our marks. It also makes sense to suppose 
that language mirrors the world, for we certainly seem to compare 
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what we write or say, with what we see to be the facts of the matter. 
Moreover, this picture of language is wholly in keeping with the 
psychological studies which indicate that children appreciate a good 
bit about the world before they talk. For, if the world were 
language dependent, children would remain in complete ignorance of it 
until they began to speak. This form of "Metaphysical Realism" seems 
indisputable. 
